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MARY BUTLER/ previously known 
as MARY HILL/ 
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vs. 
HANK L. LEE and JANET W. LEE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT$ 
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2. Whether abundant alternat 
improvements thereon permits a find 
implication pursuant to a claim that th^ 
inadequate/ inconvenient/ difficult or c 
3. Whether the trial court 
admission of testimony pertaining to 
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sale/ conveyance and 
ssly negate any other 
between the parties, 
ve access to land and 
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alternative access is 
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erred in denying the 
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defendants-appellants if their property should be subjected to 
the easement claimed by plaintiff-respondent. 
4. Whether the parties by implication intended a 
permanent easement or a revocable license. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment on declaratory 
judgment entered in the District Court of Davis County/ State of 
Utah/ July 23/ 1987/ by the Honorable Rodney S. Page# granting 
an easement by implication or necessity. A motion to vacate 
the judgment was filed by defendants-appellants under Rule 60 
(b) (1)/ (2), (3) and (7)/ alleging that the uniform real estate 
contract understated the true purchase price by $30/000.00 which 
was paid by defendants to plaintiff's former husband as a 
condition precedent to the sale. After hearing on November 3/ 
1987/ the Honorable Rodney S. Page denied the motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the trial 
court reversed and vacated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
uniform real estate 
Hank and Janet Lee / 
on Chinese immigrants/ 
restaurant with front 
used car salesman and 
plaintiff-respondent. 
buyers/ to Jack Hill/ 
Pursuant to the terms of a 
contract/ dated September 1/ 1981/ 
defendants-appellants and first generatij 
purchased real property/ comprised of a 
and rear parking lots/ from Jack Hill/ al 
the former husband of Mary Butler/ the 
The said uniform real estate contract di|d not reflect the true 
purchase price because it contained no iqention of a $30/000.00 
cash payment by Hank and Janet Lee, the 
the seller/ as an unmentioned cash paymertit requested by Hill as 
a necessary condition precedent to said ^ale. After principal 
payments by Hank and Janet Lee tota 
interest/ title to the property was convleyed to them from Hill 
by means of a warranty deed dated September 11/ 1986/ which 
conveyance occurred more than one year af 
this action by Mary Butler/ plaintiff-res 
None of the documents provided 
the closing of said sale by Hill's 
Company/ Farmington/ Utah/ including the uniform real estate 
contract/ a copy of the proposed warranty deed/ the title 
insurance policy/ or the closing statement/ contained any 
reservation of an easement upon or overl the subject property, 
Contrary to any such reservation/ howeve|r/ was the language of 
ling $115/000.00 plus 
ter the commencement of 
pondent. 
Hank and Janet Lee at 
lagent/ Security Title 
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the uniform real estate contract negating any other 
"representations/ covenants or agreements between the parties." 
All sale documents were prepared by Security Title Company, the 
agent of the seller/ Jack Hill. 
Prior to the purchase Hank Lee had leased the 
restaurant and parking lots from Jack Hill and was aware of his 
clients1 driving over and across the rear parking lot to gain 
access to the storage stalls located on the north side of Mr. 
Hill's storage shed. Mr. Lee testified that he had no 
objection to the temporary use of his rear parking lot by others 
because/ "...when they use them they might be the customers that 
come to the restaurant and so it's generally what they want to 
do." (T. 69.) 
During the summer of 1985/ Hank Lee developed plans 
for the construction of a commercial building upon his rear 
parking lot. Mary Butler filed an action for declaratory 
judgment claiming an easement over Mr. Lee's rear parking lot 
for ingress and egress to the storage shed located on the 
southeast corner of her property acquired from Mr. Hill as part 
of her divorce settlement. Mr. Lee's proposed construction 
would prevent vehicular access to only four of the twenty-four 
storage spaces contained in plaintiff's storage shed. (Ex. 2.) 
Although the use of Mr. Lee's land had been a convenience to 
Mrs. Butler and her clients/ it was not the only access to her 
- 4 -
land and the storage shed/ nor was it Absolutely necessary to 
her enjoyment of her land and its improvements* On the other 
hand/ the easement established by the judgment in question 
precludes any development of Mr. Lee's property subject to said 
easement which extends essentially over 
area. 
|iis entire rear parking 
ARGUMENT 
Although there have been many jjecisions of this court 
finding easements by implication or necessity/ the facts of all 
such cases are substantially different from the present case. 
Prior decisions have involved roads/ l&nes/ narrow strips of 
land/ sidewalks/ driveways/ alleys/ canals/ ditches/ pipe lines/ 
power lines and bridges/ but none have involved an implied 
easement over and across a very substantial land area servient 
to only a portion of a storage shed. 
cases can be clearly distinguished ffom the present case, 
necessitating a consideration of other authority frequently 
cited by this court. The RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
contains a list of relevant factors previously considered by 
this court in determining the existence of an implied easement: 
In determining whether the circumstances 
under which a conveyance of land is made imply an 
easement/ the following factory are important 
Consequently/ the Utah 
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(a) whether the claimant is the conveyor or 
the conveyee/ 
(b) the terms of the conveyance/ 
(c) the consideration given for it/ 
(d) whether the claim is made against a 
simultaneous conveyee/ 
(e) the extent of necessity of the easement 
to the claimant/ 
(f) whether reciprocal benefits result to 
the conveyor and the conveyee/ 
(g) the manner in which the land was used 
prior to its conveyance/ and 
(h) the extent to which the manner of prior 
use was or might have been known to the 
parties. RESTATEMENT/ PROPERTY §476 
(1944); Adamson v. Brockbank/ 185 P2d. 
264/ 270-271 (Utah 1947). 
Only two of the factors above cited lend support to 
the finding of an easement in the present case — use of the 
land prior to the conveyance and knowledge of that use by the 
parties. A majority of the other applicable or pertinent 
factors to be considered lend no support to an implied easement 
in the present case. 
I. WHETHER AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION MAY BE INFERRED 
FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS OF SALE/ CONVEYANCE AND INSURANCE BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES/ ALL OF WHICH EXPRESSLY NEGATE ANY OTHER 
REPRESENTATIONS/ COVENANTS OR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
All documents pertaining to the sale and conveyance of 
the property upon and over which the implied easement is claimed 
were prepared by Security Title Company/ Partington/ Utah/ as 
the agent of the conveyor/ Jack Hill — the seller in the 
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instant case. Mr. Hill gave said agent all instructions for 
lved against the party 
the preparation of the sale documents and paid for the title 
insurance (T. 48-49.), none of which documents contained any 
reference to or reservation of an easemenlt. 
The applicable rule frequently enunciated by this 
court is that a contract should be resoj 
who had the contract drawn. Sears v. Riemersma/ 655 P.2d 1105 
(Utah 1982). Additionally/ the first factor cited by the 
RESTATEMENT suggests that any doubts in construing the 
conveyance should be resolved in favor of the conveyees because 
...the conveyor controls both the language of 
the conveyance and the circumstances under 
which it is made and has power to make the 
language of the conveyance express the 
intention of the parties. To the extent to 
which this is true his failure to make it do so 
is held to operate to his disadvantage rather 
than to the disadvantage of the conveyee. 
What is true in construing the language of a 
conveyance is likewise true in drawing 
inferences from the circumstances under which 
the conveyance was made, j Accordingly/ 
circumstances which may be sufficient to imply 
the creation of an easement in favor of a 
conveyee may not be sufficient to imply the 
creation of one in favor of the conveyor. 
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §476/ comment C/ p. 2977 
(1944). 
In Utah no implication of easement from a warranty 
deed can be entertained without special and deliberative 
consideration of two pertinent Utah statutes/ the statute of 
frauds/ Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 (1984 Repl. Vol.)/ and the 
- 7 -
statute pertaining to warranty deeds/ Utah Code Ann. §57-1-11 
(1986 Repl. Vol.)/ which alternatively require a writing 
subscribed by the creator of the easement/ or "... that the 
premises are free from all encumbrances. ...w if there is no 
easement reservation. 
Typical of the implied easement cases is the 
construction or interpretation of only one document of 
conveyance to determine the intent of the parties; however/ the 
instant case presents three documents for construction of 
intent/ i.e./ the uniform real estate contract/ the title 
insurance policy and the warranty deed/ all containing express 
negations of any encumbrance or easement and all requiring a 
construction favorable to the conveyees/ Mr. and Mrs. Lee. It 
is rationally impossible to infer any easement or any other type 
of encumbrance from the terms of these conveyance documents. 
They all totally negate any such inference. 
There is only one overruling factor cited by the 
RESTATEMENT. It is the second/ the terms of the conveyance. 
d. Terms of Conveyance. The implication of an 
easement may always be prevented by language 
sufficiently explicit to negative it. No matter 
how clear the implication would otherwise be/ it 
is always subject to being overcome by the 
language used. RESTATEMENT/ PROPERTY §476/ 
comment d; p.2980 (1944). 
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It should also be carefully n6ted that the law does 
not favor easements by implication because they detract from the 
rule that written instruments speak for themselves. Thus the 
law should imply an easement in favor of a grantee more readily 
than in favor of a grantor, Freightways Term. Co. v. Industrial 
& Com. Const./ Inc./ 381 P.2d 977/ 983 (Alaska 1963). 
II. WHETHER ABUNDANT ALTERNATIVE ACCESS TO LAND AND 
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON PERMITS A FINDING OF EASEMENT BY 
IMPLICATION OR NECESSITY PURSUANT TO A CLAIM THAT THE 
ALTERNATIVE ACCESS IS INADEQUATE/ INCONVENIENT/ DIFFICULT OR 
COSTLY. 
A critical fact in the instant case is that none of 
Mary Butler's property is landlocked. All of the land has ample 
access to U.S. Highway 89-91. (T. 85.) It is only a portion of 
the storage shed — 4 stalls out of a total of 24 or 
approximately l/6th of the total improvement — that would have 
limited access/ but only from the north/ if Mr. Lee is permitted 
to build his commercial building across the rear of his parking 
lot. Not even the space within those few sta I 1s would be 
deprived of vehicular access if modest and relatively 
- 9 -
inexpensive alterations were made in a manner similar to the 
same modification which had been previously made to two units of 
the same storage shed. (T. 44.) 
The most frequently cited Utah authority recognizing 
ways of necessity is Morris v. Blount/ 161 P.2d. 1127/ 1132 
(Utah 1916)/ which defines the essential elements of an easement 
by severance or necessity to be as follows: 
(1) Unity of title followed by severance; 
(2) That at the time of the severance the 
servitude was apparent/ obvious and visible; 
(3) That the easement is reasonably necessary to 
the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and 
(4) It must usually be continuous and self-
acting/ as distinguished from one used only 
from time to time when occasion arises. 
Savage v. Nielsen/ 197 P.2d 117/ 122 (Utah 1948). 
Any implied easement necessitates not only an 
involvement of principles of construction to determine what the 
real intent of the parties was at the time of the conveyance/ 
Savage v. Nielsen/ Id. at 122/ but also thoughtful consideration 
of principles of wise public policy. For example/ implied 
easements should not be favored by the courts because they 
fetter estates/ retard building and improvements/ and violate 
public policies of recording acts. Orr v. Kirk/ 224 P.2d 71 
(Cal. 1950); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §8.36, P. 258 (Casner 
ed. 1952); Missouri State Oil Co. v. Fuse, 232 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 
1950); A.J. & J.O. Pillar/ Inc./ v. Lister Corporation/ 121 A.2d 
741 (N.J. 1956); Miller v. Hoeschler, 105 N.W. 790 (Wis. 1905). 
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In brief/ any inference as to intention slhould be " -nfluenced 
largely by considerations of public policy in favor of land 
utilization." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §47^/ comment g, p. 2983 
(1944). 
The Utah test of "reasonable 
balanced against the many other factors 
implied easement. Added to the already mentioned factors of 
the construction against the conveyor 
documents/ the terms of the documents and the constraints of 
public policy are the special factors in 
necessity" should be 
which weigh against an 
and preparer of the 
the instant case of the 
lopsided accrual of benefits to the dominant tenement at the 
total expense of the servient tenement and the obvious lack of 
consideration to support an implied easembnt reservation. Also, 
inveighing against implication of an easement are the 
consideration paid by Mr. Lee for his property and the manner in 
which it was required to be paid. (See Affidavit in Support of 
Motion to Vacate Judgment.) The jindisclosed $30/000.00 
downpaymeat required by the seller for solne unknown/ but suspect 
ss than legitimate tax 
to be a tax detriment 
reason/ while possibly conferring some lei 
benefit on Mr. Hill/ has certainly proven 
to Mr. Lee/ including the loss of $30/0010.00 of legitimate tax 
deductions. An additional detriment to Mr, Lee is his 
underinsured status as a title policyholder. No stretch of the 
- II 
imagination could find any reciprocal benefit flowing to the 
servient tenement from the implied easement upon and over Mr, 
Leefs property. 
In view of the preponderance of the pertinent factors 
and circumstances favoring a finding of no easement/ California 
and New York precedents ace not only suggestive/ but also 
persuasive. The New York case/ Kuczek v. Arpino/ 319 
N.Y.Supp.2d 253 (1971)/ denied an easement to a homeowner 
seeking to gain access to a cellar which the court suggested 
could probably be accessed by reopening a front entrance to the 
cellar. In California the court suggested that a landowner 
could gain access to the rear of her property by removal of a 
portion of a chicken shed, Orr v. Kirk/ 224 P,2d 71 (Cal, 
1950), The significant principle suggested by these cases/ 
although probably by "strict necessity" jurisdictions/ is that 
the minimal expense involved in developing one's own alternate 
access to obviously lower land use improvements/ not to the land 
itself/ should not overburden adjoining commercial property with 
a greater economic burden or loss. An implication of easement 
should arise only when the benefits and burdens to the adjoining 
property owners are relatively equal. 
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III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS TO 
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS IF THEIR PROPERTY SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO 
THE EASEMENT CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 
I • :. ietermine the rela t i ve ! burdens of an 
implied easement on the respective tenements/ all implication 
factors impacting the tenements must be ' considered/ especially 
the :Ii fferent costs# expenses/ losses/ limited uses# restraints 
and restrictions resulting from imposition of an implied 
easement. In the instant case Mr, Lee will lose a substantial 
business opportunity because of the easement's restraint against 
his developing and improving valuable commercial property. At 
the tr ia 1 Judge Pa.ge r e f used to pe r mI, t: Mr • Lee to tes 11 f y to 11 ie 
amount o4 loss he would sustain if ar i easement were imposed on 
the land he had planned to develop. (Tr. 67/ 68.) It is, 
therefore/ submitted that said ruling was in error and should 
justify a reversal of the judgment becausle without sue, evidence 
it is impossible to ascertain an important factor necessary to 
the determination of the existence or nonexistence of an implied 
easement. Reciprocity of benefits is impossible of 
d e t e r in, i n a 1 i o n :i f :i t c a i \ n o t it e d e t e r in i  n e d c o n c o ITI i t a n t J y e x a c 11 y 
what: losses will be sustained 1: y the property owners. 
RESTATEMENT/ PROPERTY §476/ comment h, p.i 2985 (1944). 
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IV. WHETHER THE PARTIES BY IMPLICATION INTENDED A 
PERMANENT EASEMENT OR A REVOCABLE LICENSE. 
The facts and circumstances of the present case 
suggest the implication of an oral license rather than an 
easement. A license/ being a personal/ revocable and 
unassignable privilege to do one or more acts on land without 
the ownership of any interest therein/ fits the evidence of the 
instant case better than an easement which entails an interest 
in the land and is permanent/ restricting thereby the free use 
of the fee. 25 AM. JUR. 2d Easements and Licenses §§1/ 123 
(1966). Even if Mr. Lee had promised or consented to the use of 
his land by others/ there was no evidence of any consideration 
which he received for such alleged promise. No one acted in 
reliance thereon/ and no one paid him for it. Even written 
documents expressly creating servitudes should be strictly 
construed in favor of the free use of land. Dressier v. 
Isaacs/ 343 P.2d 714 (Or. 1959). 
Mr. Lee testified that he and Mr. Hill had never 
discussed an agreement. (Tr. 64/ 65.) It was also his 
testimony that he had no objection to the use of his property by 
others to access the storage stalls on the property adjoining 
his property if it didn't interfere with his use. (Tr. 17/ 74/ 
82-87.) The clearest inference from Mr. Lee's testimony of 
conversations with Mr. Hill is that there was never a discussion 
- 14 -
of an easement, although Mr. Lee did give oral consent t: the 
9 87.) With special 
that the use of his 
use of h i s 1 =1 t id by o t he r s. ( Tr » 75 / 86L 
emphasis he expressed 1lis understanding 
property by others was not to last forever, (Tr. 82.) 
A11 h o u g h 11 :t e t e s 11 in o i i y o f M i: L e e w a s c o n t r o v e r t: e d b y M r • H i 11 
with testimony that Mr. Lee held promised to give him an easement 
and had even agreed to an easement (JTr. 9 1 . ) / it is only 
reasonable to believe that some express^, 
agreement would then appear in at least 
documents whi Hi Mr. Hi 11 had prepared. 
The long standing Idaho case, Hj 
(1905)# in addition to its clear distinguishing of a license 
from a n e a s e m e n t # c o n t a i i i s 11 i e p e r s u a s 
court should not impress real property wi 
on of that promise or 
one of the conveyance 
pwes v. Harmon/ 81 P.48 
ive suggestion that a 
ph a servitude pursuant 
to oral agreement because of the
 w riting required by tl le statute 
of frauds/ unless the evidence be clearly to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Mr. and Mrs. Lee 
acquire*:! M m it if es t ant: ant propei f y free of an easemen1 or 
encumbrance to adjoining land/ but di<^ agree to allow »'•-.-
permissive use of their rear parking lot to accommoda;, 
prior use of the land until they should| develop a higher and 
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better use for the same. It is suggested that the inordinate 
burden placed on the servient tenement is grossly inequitable 
compared to the minimal expense involved in developing Mrs. 
Butler's own alternate access to the four storage stalls that 
would lose access from the Lee property when Mr. Lee's 
commercial building is completed. The decision of the lower 
court should be reversed and vacated. 
Dated this 3rd day of December/ 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF of APPELLANTS HANK L. LEE AND JANET LEE were mailed/ 
postage prepaid/ this 3rd day of December/ 1987/ to the 
following: 
Pete N. Vlahos 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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